"...Some banks appeared unwilling to turn
away, or exit, very profitable business relationships when there appeared to be
an unacceptable risk of handling the proceeds of crime. Around a third of banks,
including the private banking arms of some major banking groups, appeared
willing to accept very high levels of money-laundering risk if the immediate
reputational and regulatory risk was acceptable..."
This is the opening paragraph of the FSA's report
of June 2011, entitled "...Banks’
management of high money-laundering risk situations..."
It helps to explain most succinctly why banks
are refusing to disclose suspicious activities. They are not making disclosures
to law enforcement because they are making huge sums of money from the practice
of money laundering, no matter how high the risk to the individual bank may be.
What this tells us immediately is that banks
and those who manage them, and this decision has to be taken at a very senior
level indeed within the organisation,
have made a conscious choice to wilfully ignore a very important piece
of legislation which is deemed vital to help law enforcement fight the
activities of major criminals, drug traffickers, fraudsters and terrorists. I
challenge them to say it isn't so, because I know it is.
This is a very simple issue. The law is there
to require banks and financial institutions to disclose their suspicions of
criminal wrongdoing if and when they
notice financial activities which are clearly out of the normal or usual range
of their clients activities, being carried on, and for which there is no reasonable
explanation.
It is
not an onerous duty, and merely requires the completion of a form spelling out
certain information about the client and the activity which is then passed on to
the relevant law enforcement agency. Such information is vital to an
intelligence-led police agency, seeking to do its best to combat organised
crime and terrorism, and it is mandated in law. It is a legal duty, for which
criminal sanctions can apply for a wilful failure to meet the relatively simple
requirements enacted in law.
We are all familiar with the myriad of cases of
single women who have been imprisoned for claiming welfare benefit, but failing
to inform the relevant authorities of the existence of a man who may stay with
them on occasions in their home. These women lose everything, including their
liberty, merely for giving in to the desire for some ordinary human contact and
love, and our society punishes and marginalises them in the cruellest ways
imaginable. They go to prison and their children go into care, and every time
this piece of social calumny occurs, the Judge trots out the usual routine
message that he is passing a custodial sentence to send a message that benefit
fraud will be taken seriously.
I am unaware of many financial practitioners
who may have received a prison sentence for failing to disclose relevant
information of suspicions of criminal activity which may have come to their
attention, and herein lies one of the major failings of the law, because it
discriminates against the weak and the powerless and it favours the rich and
powerful.
When it comes to money laundering and
compliance with a simple piece of regulation, it is an issue which is
completely ignored by the FSA, the regulatory agency with the responsibility to
ensure that financial institutions are complying with this law. The FSA have
taken their collective eye off an important element which is vital for ensuring
that the money laundering regime in the UK is enforced strictly and fairly, as
a result of which, the banks completely ignore the demands of the law.
You might be forgiven for thinking that it is
not the FSA's responsibility to regulate bank's compliance with the Money Laundering
Regulations, but it is written into the Financial Services and Markets Act
2000.
Section 6 of the Act is clear. It states that
one of the FSA's responsibilities is;
The reduction of financial crime.
(1)The reduction of financial crime objective
is: reducing the extent to which it is possible for a business carried on—
(a)by a regulated person, or
(b)in contravention of the general prohibition,
to be used for a purpose connected
with financial crime.
(2)In considering that objective the Authority
must, in particular, have regard to the desirability of—
(a)regulated persons being aware of the risk of
their businesses being used in connection with the commission of financial
crime;
(b)regulated persons taking appropriate
measures (in relation to their administration and employment practices, the
conduct of transactions by them and otherwise) to prevent financial crime,
facilitate its detection and monitor its incidence;
(c)regulated persons devoting adequate
resources to the matters mentioned in paragraph (b).
(3)“Financial crime” includes any offence
involving—
(a)fraud or dishonesty;
(b)misconduct in, or misuse of information
relating to, a financial market; or
(c)handling the proceeds of crime.
(4)“Offence” includes an act or omission which
would be an offence if it had taken place in the United Kingdom.
(5)“Regulated person” means an authorised
person, a recognised investment exchange or a recognised clearing house.
I have highlighted the relevant elements that
apply to money laundering, and I have included the element at sub-para 4 which
includes offences committed outwith the United Kingdom. Regular readers of this
blog will remember how a senior City Grandee tried to claim that it was not the
FSA's duty to regulate an HSBC bank in Mexico. This sub-section shows how wrong
he was!
I will demonstrate later how the FSA are still
trying to squirm out of their responsibilities for this requirement!
The requirements to disclose suspicious
disclosures, later suspicious activities, were first enunciated in 1994. The
banks all complained loudly and long about this requirement, because, as they
tried to argue, it ran directly counter to their traditional privilege of
keeping their clients affairs confidential. The British Home Affairs Committee
which looked into the proposed changes in the law needed to implement the soon
to be enacted European Money Laundering Directive, realised that something had
to be done to make it easier for banks to make disclosures of their suspicions
of criminal transactions, but without rendering themselves to be sued for
breach of confidentiality.
Remember, at this time the only offence which
was being considered to be covered by the money laundering law, was the proceeds
of drug trafficking, which was becoming a significant issue in UK law
enforcement.
The duty to disclose suspicions to law
enforcement was enacted as a defence for bankers against any subsequent
allegation that they had been knowingly engaged in the laundering of the
criminal proceeds of such a drug offence. So where a banker made a disclosure
of his suspicions to the relevant police agency, he could not subsequently be
prosecuted for any money laundering offence related to those proceeds, because
he had alerted the authorities to their potential existence.
They had previously declined to pass police
information without the need for a cumbersome legal procedure to obtain an
obscure Court Order, all the while maintaining their absolute willingness to
cooperate with police enquiries, save only for the prohibiting effect of the
confidentiality clause in their contract with their client.
In one stroke of the pen, the banks were
relieved of that burden and the obstacle of client confidentiality was removed,
in cases where the bank was making a bona-fide disclosure of their suspicions of
criminal money in the client's account.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, very few disclosures
arrived at the relevant police agency, indeed it quickly became obvious that
the banks were very reluctant to make any disclosures at all. Whether this was
born out of a sense of willing disbelief that their clients might be up to no
good, or because, as I have always suspected, the banks never had any intention
of talking to police in the first place, and resisted becoming suspicious, is
merely a matter for conjecture. We do know that within a relatively short time,
Parliament had to enact an amendment which made it mandatory for employees in the
banking community to pass suspicions of criminal conduct to police, where the
knowledge or suspicion came to them during their ordinary duties in the bank.
The
point is you would think that any banker, coming face to face with such an
eventuality, would want to make a disclosure to the police, in order to benefit
from the defence provision, but for some reason, we know that banks are still
very resistant to making any kind of realistic disclosures to the Police, and
we need to understand why that is.
We only have the banks' actions and conduct to
measure this particular failing, it's not as if they make a virtue out of
telling us their reasons for flouting the law.
We can rely to some extent on their own words,
as where I was invited to address the Group Heads of AML in a number of major
banks in London, and they made their feelings about the AML regime perfectly clearly,
they think it is a waste of time, effort and money!
They will all say, if asked, that their
institutions spend a great deal of time, effort and money complying with the
AML requirements, but in reality, their efforts are little more than window
dressing, and they do not go near the implementation of the core requirements
of the legislation.
As the Group Head of one of the most egregious banks in
London for money laundering said to me at the dinner, '...It's a total waste of
time and money and I am not going to bother worrying about passing detailed
transaction disclosures to the police....'
This man also gave me the answer to the second
part of the riddle, because when I asked him if he was not worried about being
dealt with for failing to do the job properly, his answer was that '...no-one
gets dealt with for this issue, so he wasn't going to worry about it...'
I think that is where we have it in a nutshell.
The banks don't want to pass information about
clients' affairs to the police, because they are making a great deal of dirty money out of
the practice, but they believe that if the word gets round
their client base that they are too compliant with the law on passing
incriminating information to the police, then they will lose client share, and
thus, client money.
The FSA don't regulate the financial sector's compliance
with the AML Regulations or the substantive law sufficiently, to make their
presence a real threat which has to be acknowledged, and as a result, the banks
rest content that they don't have to do too much to comply.
So, they don't bother to train their staff in
compliance skills, they don't train them how to properly analyse computer-generated
alerts, they don't teach them how to maintain an effective client surveillance
database which might be capable of recalling previously unusual episodes, they
simply do the least possible to get a tick in the box from a complacent regulator,
and they carry on as if nothing was happening.
The end result is a situation where a great
deal of shareholders' money gets spent in creating the impression of compliance with the
AML laws and regulations, but where, in reality, it is business as usual when
the dirty money comes rolling in.
How else can you explain what happened at HSBC,
when the 'Laundering Bank', (for that is how we must now christen it), went
ahead and created a deliberate money laundering structure in Mexico, and used
it for facilitating the movement of Mexican drug money belonging to the drug
cartels?
This wasn't an accident, you don't let things
like this occur without anyone noticing. It was deliberate and it was a
business case decision, and they got away with it, because no-one in HSBC was
sentenced to any term of imprisonment.
And why did they not get prosecuted here in the UK? Because the FSA has now made a conscious decision that they are
not going to do anything about money laundering cases.
Earlier I set out the terms of Section 6 of the
Financial Services and Markets Act which empowers the FSA to act in money laundering
cases. Following the LIBOR scandals, the House of Commons Treasury Select
Committee has criticised the FSA for their failings in dealing with relevant
elements of regulatory responsibility.
The FSA has sought to rebut those criticisms, and what follows is taken from
their report. The Select Committee's feelings are reported in the bold type.
"...The FSA has an obligation
under section 2(1)(b) of FSMA to discharge its functions in the way in which it
considers most appropriate for the purpose of meeting its regulatory
objectives. Under section 2(2)(d) the reduction of financial crime is one of
these objectives. Financial crime is defined in section 6(3) as including not
only misconduct in relation to a financial market but also any criminal offence
of fraud or dishonesty. The FSA took a narrow view of its power to initiate
criminal proceedings for fraudulent conduct in this case. (Paragraph 202)..."
The FSA's response (in italics) states:
38. The FSA has extensive
powers to investigate specified offences, both regulatory and criminal (as set
out in FSMA). These powers of investigation do not, however, extend to other
offences not specified in FSMA such as theft, fraud and false accounting. The
police and the SFO do have powers to investigate these offences so we cannot
use our powers specifically to obtain material relevant to these offences.
This is not strictly accurate, indeed it is not
true, the FSA have perfectly ordinary common law powers, the same as possessed
by the Police and that feature has been made perfectly clear to the FSA by the
Courts, and I don't know why they keep on trying to assert the contrary. On
29th July 2010 the Supreme Court confirmed FSA’s power to prosecute money
laundering offences.
The Court of Appeal decision in R v
Rollins, concerned a prosecution by the FSA for insider dealing and money
laundering. In that case, the Court of Appeal confirmed the FSA’s power
to prosecute offences beyond those expressly set out in the Financial Services
& Markets Act 2000 ( “FSMA”), including money-laundering offences under the
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (“POCA”). That decision was subsequently
appealed and on 28 July 2010, the Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the
appeal.
The Supreme Court observed the FSA’s objects include carrying out any functions conferred on it by statute. FSMA sets out the FSA's functions and objectives, which includes acting in a way that it considers most appropriate to meet its regulatory objectives, including the reduction of financial crime. In this regard, it has powers of prosecution.
The Court noted that as one of the FSA’s functions was to reduce financial crime, “Parliament would not have intended to deprive the FSA of the power to prosecute for offences of financial crime (of which sections 327 and 328 of POCA are examples)”. If the FSA was limited to prosecuting solely the offences listed in section 402, this would be an “inefficient and unsatisfactory way of prosecuting crime”; there was no need to infer that Parliament intended to limit the FSA’s power in this way.
The Supreme Court observed the FSA’s objects include carrying out any functions conferred on it by statute. FSMA sets out the FSA's functions and objectives, which includes acting in a way that it considers most appropriate to meet its regulatory objectives, including the reduction of financial crime. In this regard, it has powers of prosecution.
The Court noted that as one of the FSA’s functions was to reduce financial crime, “Parliament would not have intended to deprive the FSA of the power to prosecute for offences of financial crime (of which sections 327 and 328 of POCA are examples)”. If the FSA was limited to prosecuting solely the offences listed in section 402, this would be an “inefficient and unsatisfactory way of prosecuting crime”; there was no need to infer that Parliament intended to limit the FSA’s power in this way.
The FSA continued;
39. We may of course
discover evidence of these more general offences whilst conducting
investigations under the powers set out in FSMA. For example, we may discover
evidence of fraud whilst investigating whether a regulatory breach has occurred, or a market abuse offence has been committed. In
these circumstances, there is a well established procedure for discussions to
take place between the FSA and the SFO or other prosecutors about how to deal
with that evidence. This is in accordance with the Prosecutors' Convention, to which
both the FSA and the SFO are signatories. Such discussions might lead to the
SFO opening its own investigation.
Well, yes indeed, they might do. But they might
just as easily not take place. Pigs might fly, turkeys might vote for
Christmas, but unless the FSA are going to be more willing to share their
evidence with other agencies, it is unlikely that many prosecutions will flow.
What happens if the specific case does not fit in with the SFO's terms of
operation, as where the sums involved are under £2 million?
Let us just say that the FSA do not think they
take a narrow view of their powers. Others might disagree with them!
The bottom line here however, is that the FSA
clearly want as little to do as possible with the AML requirements, so as far
as prosecuting financial institutions for breaches of the Money Laundering
Regulations are concerned, we must all get used to the idea that such an event
will be a triumph of hope over experience.
All the time the banks know they will not be
called to account for failing to deal with the money laundering regulations
properly, they will continue to permit vast amounts of criminal money to enter their
books by money laundering for drug traffickers, tax
evaders, thieves, fraudsters and terrorists. It's not rocket science, it's just
the way it is!
1 comment:
“Gresham’s” dynamic.
[D]ishonest dealings tend to drive honest dealings out of the market. The cost of dishonesty, therefore, lies not only in the amount by which the purchaser is cheated; the cost also must include the loss incurred from driving legitimate business out of existence. George Akerlof (1970)".
Professor Bill Black is an expert on the criminogenic environment in which the banks operate:
http://think-left.org/2013/01/31/criminogenic-environments-like-the-city-of-london/
Post a Comment