Leonardo di Caprio was interviewed by Andrew Marr on
Sunday morning about his new film 'The Wolf of Wall Street'.
The story of an ambitious young fraudster who created and
set up a major bucket-shop share selling operation, revelling in the advice
given to him by one of his mentors in immoral philosophy - "...the name of
the game is to move the money from your client's pocket into your
pocket..."
Marr raises the issue of the moral message being sent by
the film and wonders why it seems to contain no final dénouement for the young
con man. He posits that such films normally seek to end on an ethical message
that crime does not pay, whereas this film does not, so the audience is left in
a moral vacuum. It is as if Marr is a subscriber to the theory that films about
financial criminality must never end with the protagonists getting away with
the proceeds of their crimes, as this sends a suspect moral message to the
audience about the nature of crime, greed and dishonesty. The film must, it
seems, become the vehicle for a moral parable, whereby good, truth and justice
triumph at the end.
In this film,. it seems, the obverse is true, and in such
a representation, di Caprio, very cleverly, identifies the major conundrum at
the root of financial regulation in the 21st century in Western capital
markets. In the programme, Marr asks him whether his portrayal of the fraudster
is authentic because in the end he gets away with his crimes. Di Caprio's
answer is prophetic; he says; "...Yes, I believe it is authentic because
when you look back, most of the people doing this stuff got paid
bonuses..."
I believe that this revisionist view of the financial
sector is closer to the truth than many people are willing to admit.
I believe that it has always been thus and it sometimes
irritates me a little when I seek to point out the discrepancies between what
is accepted wisdom and what is the reality of the case, that I get told by so
many main-stream practitioners that I am some kind of disruptive element who
doesn't understand the realpolitick of the financial sector.
The traditional view of the financial sector is that
those who work within its walls are decent and honest, and that if there are
any rotten apples, they are very much a minority and they are quickly weeded
out by the good guys!
This is a shibboleth which is maintained by every
principle to which the financial sector adheres, but when it is deconstructed,
it quickly becomes obvious that it is not true.
I spent many years examining and investigating the
activities of (mostly) men who ran criminal organisations from within the City
of London, and in every case, they were fully aware of what they were doing.
They operated in the margins between what was acceptable
conduct and what was considered to be too risky to permit because it was too
obviously criminal.
One man I investigated (an incredibly intelligent guy)
ran a retail futures brokerage. His company was a by-word in the City for sharp
practice, and he attracted a very wide bad press.
His clients were always
complaining that they had been ripped off by his slick cold-calling sales-team,
and yet, when I investigated his actions, I discovered that he was punctilious
about informing his clients, right from the start, his business methods and his
tactics.
He told them when he would invest their capital, when he
would close their positions, how much commission he would charge them, when he
would reposition them into another contract, etc.
All was explained before the money changed hands, and all
clients signed a full disclosure statement indicating that they understood the
tactics, and the methods, and that they were willing to go ahead and allow his
traders to do business on their behalf.
He was completely open about what he intended to do, and
he did not deviate from his disclosed methods subsequently.
Some of his clients ( a few) made a great deal of money.
Most of them lost everything. He became a multi-millionaire.
He was never charged with any criminal offences, because
there was no evidence that what he was doing was criminal. Sharp practice,
certainly, but fully pre-disclosed.
When I interviewed him, he was quite open about his
techniques. He told me how he had started in the City working for a sugar
broker as a trainee after leaving Oxford. One day, early in his career, one of
the traders on his desk made a small killing ripping off another trader in
another house.
He told me; "...I was aghast, I was convinced we
would all get the sack when the boss found out. You see, I genuinely accepted
all that crap about 'Utmost good faith' and 'My word is my bond' and all that
other City bullshit, so I believed I would lose my job and the entire trading
desk would be sacked..."
"...As it was, the boss came down and was roaring
with laughter and clapping the trader on the back and sending out for
Champagne..."
"...The following week, the trader in the other
house ripped our desk trader off, in another deal. The boss came down again,
roaring with laughter, and sent out for more champagne, except this time he
made our desk trader pay for it..."
"...After that I realised that the only rule of the
City was to make money, and not to get caught out, so having learned everything
they could teach me, I left and started up my own brokerage. I realised that I
could make money simply by playing the market mathematics, which were stacked
in the favour of the trading house, and as long as I disclosed everything to
the client first then I would be covered..."
He was right, of course, and he retired a fabulously
wealthy man, but not before the rest of his business milieu grassed him up to
the regulators and tried to get an SFO investigation into has activities.
As it was, I was able to turn over to the SFO all my
investigations which demonstrated that he was not formally breaking the fraud
statutes, and his regulatory agency was later forced to drop most actions
against him.
His fellow futures brokers denounced him because while
they were engaging in exactly the same dirty tactics as he was, they were not
undertaking all his risk-disclosure practices, which meant they were far more
criminally exposed, but as long as they all stuck together claiming that as
they were all engaged in the same egregious behaviour, it couldn't be
dishonest, they were confident that no-one would investigate them.
For me it was a fascinating exercise in double standards
and criminogenic behaviour and it was where I began to realise the truth of the
work undertaken by the criminologist David Matza. Matza wanted to build upon Edwin
Sutherland's theory of Differential Association which states that an individual
learns criminal behaviour through (a) techniques of committing crimes and (b)
motives, drives, rationalizations, and attitudes which go against law-abiding
actions. These techniques reduce the social controls over the delinquent . Neutralization
is defined as a technique, which allows the person to rationalize or justify a
criminal act.
I am now convinced that the vast bulk of business
conducted in the City possesses a quasi-criminogenic capacity, and that by far
the majority of the city practitioners are willing and capable of committing
criminal offences in return for the vastly inflated values of salaries and
bonuses they habitually receive, which is not only how they make the vast
profits they do, but is also a marvellous mechanism for keeping them in line,
for fear of losing this level of income they could not legitimately earn
elsewhere.
This is the problem faced by the politicians, and
regulators who oversee the conduct of the financial markets, they are simply
unable, but also unwilling to perceive the people they regulate as behaving in
a criminal manner. They just will not accept that such is the case, and thus
they fail to meet the requisite standards of understanding how to legislate and
regulate the Square Mile, and this is why they continually fail to provide the
standards and the conditions under which crime will be less likely to be
committed.
The harsh reality is that the present regime of
politicians who sit on Parliamentary oversight committees are not willing to
accept that the financial sector is an organised criminal enterprise, a mafia,
which operates by its own rules and mores, and ignores the conventional rules
of engagement; while its financial regulators are simply not qualified to
understand the nature of the criminals with whom they are called upon to deal,
thus rendering themselves incompetent to engage with the vast bulk of the
problems associated with City wrong-doing. All the time these people go unpunished,
there is no incentive for them to obey the laws.
The American used not to suffer from this failing.
When I was sent to Washington to study with the
Securities and Exchange Commission back in 1985, I recall the then head of the
Enforcement Division, John Fedders saying to me;
"...You British seem to believe that financial
markets can be regulated by gentlemen, in their spare time, in between making
deals. You assume that every man who handles another person's money is a
gentleman, and you are shocked and horrified when you discover it is not so.
Here in America we assume that every man who handles another person's money has
the propensity to be a criminal, and we legislate for the likelihood. Until you
understand the truth of that reality you will continue to suffer from the kind
of scandals that make you a joke. When you are prepared to spend the money
necessary to implement a regulatory system that really works, then we will talk
to you, but until then, don't waste our time...!"
That was back in the day when the SEC really was a force
to be reckoned with and had not had its teeth and claws drawn by successive
Administrations under Regan, Clinton and Bush.
Leonard di Caprio's new film seeks to make the case for a
recognition that crime does pay, has paid and is still paying. I would make it
compulsory viewing for every financial regulator so that they can understand
the truth of the market they seek to police. The only problem is that none of
them would believe it, so we shall continue to suffer from more and more
financial scandals, while the bankers will continue to be paid their bonuses.
2 comments:
Great post Rowan. I was reminded that it was Woody Allen who when asked for the definition of stockbroker replied; "he's a man who invests your money until it's all gone."
On Tuesday I posted on meerkats and wolves. Your post invites me to think that in The City we have many wolves dressed as meerkats.
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